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“Incorrigibility is Inconsistent with
Youth”: The Supreme Court’s Missed
Opportunity to Cure the Contradiction
Implicit in Discretionary JLWOP
Sentencing
ANA IONESCU *
The juvenile life without parole (“JLWOP”) caselaw is
based in part on the science underlying adolescent brain development. Numerous research studies have examined the
behaviors and brain processes of adolescents. Courts have
relied on these findings in reaching some of its most important decisions affecting juveniles implicated in the criminal justice system. The latest of those decisions came in
2021 with the Jones v. Mississippi case before the United
States Supreme Court. The Court held that a sentencing
court is not required to make a specific finding of permanent
incorrigibility before sentencing the juvenile defendant to
life without parole. This Comment exposes the contradiction
implicit in the permanent incorrigibility standard applied in
JLWOP cases: how can juveniles be found to have transient
characteristics but also be deemed permanently incorrigible? Specifically, the paradox lies in a discretionary
JLWOP sentence because it implies that the juvenile’s crime
reflects permanent incorrigibility, and the child is forever
incapable of being reformed. However, adolescent brain science supports the findings that juveniles possess temporary
*
J.D. 2021, University of Miami School of Law; B.A. 2019, Tulane University. Thank you to Professor Shara Pelz, Jae Lynn Huckaba, and Amanda LopezCardet for all your guidance and support throughout this writing process. I would
also like to thank Hannah Van De Car, Katy Walker, and Shon Williams for continuously inspiring me to advocate for the youth in our communities.
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attributes, and the adolescent brain continues to develop
through adulthood, such that juveniles have an enhanced capacity for rehabilitation. Moreover, courts have adopted
these scientific truths as binding precedent. Ultimately, the
Supreme Court justices missed a perfect opportunity in Jones
to eliminate the contradictory permanent incorrigibility
standard from the JLWOP sentencing scheme.
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INTRODUCTION
Juvenile life without parole (“JLWOP”) represents the crossroads of adolescent brain development and juvenile justice. The focus on juvenile criminals peaked in the 1980s and 1990s when there
was an increase in juvenile crime. 1 As fear and panic crippled society, a Princeton academic, John DiLulio, coined the term “superpredator” to refer to these vulnerable youth. 2 Taking advantage of
the hysteria created by this pseudo-scientific theory, politicians
pushed forward JLWOP sentencing policies that “collapsed the distinctions between young offenders and adult offenders.” 3 The Phillips Black Project reported that there was an increase in JLWOP
sentencing starting in 1994 despite a drop in homicides during this
same timeframe. 4 Today, the majority of JLWOP sentences being
served resulted from superpredator-inspired policies. 5 This mantra
of “[a]dult time for adult crime” 6 has since been reversed with various landmark rulings by the Supreme Court of the United States. 7
JOHN R. MILLS et al., NO HOPE: RE-EXAMINING LIFETIME SENTENCES FOR
JUVENILE OFFENDERS 10–12 (2015); see also Alexandra O. Cohen et al., When
Does a Juvenile Become an Adult? Implications for Law and Policy, 88 TEMP. L.
REV. 769, 772–73 (2016).
2
John DiLulio, The Coming of the Superpredators, WASH. EXAM’R (Nov.
27, 1995), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/the-comingof-the-super-predators (“On the horizon, therefore, are tens of thousands of severely morally impoverished juvenile super-predators. They are perfectly capable
of committing the most heinous acts of physical violence for the most trivial reasons (for example, a perception of slight disrespect or the accident of being in
their path). They fear neither the stigma of arrest nor the pain of imprisonment.
They live by the meanest code of the meanest streets, a code that reinforces rather
than restrains their violent, hair-trigger mentality. In prison or out, the things that
superpredators get by their criminal behavior—sex, drugs, money —are their own
immediate rewards. Nothing else matters to them. So for as long as their youthful
energies hold out, they will do what comes ‘naturally’: murder, rape, rob, assault,
burglarize, deal deadly drugs, and get high.”).
3
Cohen et al., supra note 1, at 773; see also Mills et al., supra note 1, at 10–
12.
4
Mills et al., supra note 1, at 11.
5
Id. at 12.
6
Cohen et al., supra note 1, at 773.
7
See, e.g., Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 206 (2016) (ruling Miller must be applied retroactively); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012)
(prohibiting mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles); Graham v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (banning life without parole sentences for juvenile
1
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Modern advances in neuroscience and brain imaging technologies not only disproved the superpredator myth but demonstrated
that the adolescent brain is continuously changing. This emerging
body of research constructed a new perception of the adolescent “as
not only less culpable but also as unformed and full of hidden capacity to grow.” 8 Studies also revealed that the prefrontal cortex—
responsible for impulse control, decision making, and assessing
risks—develops through adulthood. 9 Furthermore, the limbic system—responsible for emotional processing—hijacks the prefrontal
regions to encourage emotionally triggered behaviors until the brain
reaches full maturity in the middle-to-late twenties. 10 The Supreme
Court recognized the essential difference between juveniles and
adults when banning mandatory JLWOP and requiring sentencers to
consider these distinctive yet transitory attributes of adolescence. 11
The evolving understanding of adolescent brains and its impact on
the juvenile justice system highlights the remarkable progress in science and the law as well as the progress left to be made.
Jones v. Mississippi was the Supreme Court’s chance to further
the precedent that youth matters in the eyes of the law. 12 The case
involved a fifteen-year-old who stabbed his grandfather to death and
was sentenced to life without parole. 13 Almost sixteen years later,
Jones appealed his case to the Supreme Court to determine if the
failure of the Mississippi courts to make an explicit finding of his
permanent incorrigibility rendered his JLWOP sentence unconstitutional. 14
offenders of non-homicide crimes); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005)
(abolishing death penalty for juveniles); see also Cohen et al., supra note 1, at 773
(“Experts (including the originators of the superpredator theory) have since
acknowledged that the superpredator theory was a myth, removing a critical foundational component for the perception of contemporary adolescents as more dangerous and more mature.”).
8
M. Eve Hanan, Incapacitating Errors: Sentencing and the Science of
Change, 97 DENV. L. REV. 151, 161 (2019).
9
See discussion infra Section III.B.
10
Id.
11
See Miller, 567 U.S. at 479–80.
12
See Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021).
13
Id. at 1312.
14
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307
(2021) (No. 18-1259).
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Permanent incorrigibility is a relatively niche term, most commonly applied in the juvenile courts to refer to children who are destined for a criminal life and can never be corrected. 15 The courts
contrast permanent incorrigibility with transient immaturity to distinguish between the juveniles who deserve JLWOP and juveniles
for whom JLWOP would be unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment. 16 Courts have never provided a precise definition of
permanent incorrigibility. Instead, the courts have been divided over
whether such an explicit finding is even required in the JLWOP sentencing scheme. 17
This Comment will take a scientific and legal approach to expose the underlying contradiction behind this issue of permanent incorrigibility as a whole. Part I outlines the line of cases establishing
that children should be treated differently in the sentencing courts
and clarifies certain implications of this precedent. It also highlights
the states that have abolished JLWOP through legislation or state
supreme court decisions. Part II summarizes the Jones case recently
decided by the Supreme Court, which magnifies this very issue of
permanent incorrigibility and its procedural requirements. Part III
presents the science behind adolescent development as it relates to
JLWOP sentencing through a discussion of the neurological system,
its mechanisms in teen brains, and the consequences of this developmental stage. Part IV concludes with the argument that the permanent incorrigibility standard contradicts the scientific findings regarding adolescent brains and the JLWOP caselaw itself. Finally,
this Comment describes a suggested holding in Jones that would
have reconciled the juvenile sentencing precedent with the science
of brain development.

See Incorrigible, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/incorrigible (last visited Dec. 22, 2020) (defining incorrigible).
16
See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 209 (2016); U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII.
17
See discussion infra Section I.A.
15
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THE LITIGATION AND LEGISLATION LANDSCAPE OF JLWOP

A.
Creating the “Children are Different” Precedent
The introduction of adolescent neuroscience into courtrooms has
paved the way for vastly important and necessary transformations in
the juvenile justice system, particularly in the sentencing schemes.
The catalyst for such systematic reform in the constitutional rights
of children began with Roper v. Simmons. 18 Roper addressed
“whether it is permissible under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States to execute a juvenile
offender who was older than 15 but younger than 18 when he committed a capital crime.” 19 The case dealt with a seventeen-year-old
who committed murder. 20 The Court relied on three developmental
principles unique to juveniles when deciding that the imposition of
the death penalty on a child is unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment. 21 First, minors possess a “‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility . . . .’” 22 Second, children “are
more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside
pressures, including peer pressure.” 23 Third, a juvenile’s character
and personality are more transitory and “less fixed” than those of an
adult. 24 Therefore, “the death penalty cannot be imposed upon juvenile offenders.” 25
Following in Roper’s footsteps and expanding beyond the capital punishment context, Graham v. Florida answered “whether the
Constitution permits a juvenile offender to be sentenced to life in
prison without parole for a nonhomicide crime.” 26 The sixteen-yearold defendant here was charged with armed burglary with assault or
battery, and attempted armed robbery. 27 Analogizing an adult death

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
Id. at 555–56.
Id. at 556.
Id. at 569.
Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 570.
Id. at 575.
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 52–53 (2010).
Id. at 53.
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penalty sentence with a JLWOP sentence 28 and applying the same
scientific principles revealed in Roper, 29 the Court held that “[t]he
Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.” 30 The
Court reiterated that psychological and neurological advancements
continue to demonstrate the “fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds.” 31 These differences persuaded the Court to
conclude that the penological justifications for incarceration make
life without parole sentences disproportionate for juvenile, nonhomicide offenders. 32
Shortly after, a landmark case in juvenile sentencing arrived.
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Miller v. Alabama consolidated two
cases of two fourteen-year-olds convicted of murder and sentenced
to mandatory JLWOP. 33 The Court held “that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” 34 It based its
Id. at 79 (“Life in prison without the possibility of parole gives no chance
for fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation with society, no
hope.”).
29
Id. at 68 (“No recent data provide reason to reconsider the Court’s observations in Roper about the nature of juveniles. As petitioner’s amici point out,
developments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds.”).
30
Id. at 82.
31
Id. at 68–69 (“It follows that, when compared to an adult murderer, a juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished moral culpability. The age of the offender and the nature of the crime each bear on the
analysis.”).
32
Id. at 74. The Court reviewed the four penological goals: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. Id. at 71. Retribution did not justify
JLWOP for non-homicide offense because juveniles are less culpable than adults.
Id. at 71–72. Deterrence did not support life without parole in non-homicide cases
because juveniles’ impulsivity and lack of maturity make it less likely that they
consider the consequences or punishments when making decisions. Id. at 72. Incapacitation was not a “legitimate reason for imprisonment” because it relies on
the assumption that minors will always be dangerous, which requires an incorrigible judgment that is questionable considering the characteristics of juveniles.
Id. at 72–73. Lastly, rehabilitation did not justify JLWOP in non-homicide crimes
because it “forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal,” which is improper given
a juvenile non-homicide offender’s lessened moral culpability and heightened capacity for change. Id. at 74.
33
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012).
34
Id. at 479.
28
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decision on psychological research and neuroscience demonstrating
that adolescence is characterized by “transient rashness, proclivity
for risk, and inability to assess consequences.” 35 As a result, the
Court required that the sentencer “take into account how children
are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably
sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” 36
The Miller Court further highlighted five aspects, known as the
“Miller factors,” to guide sentencing authorities in their determinations of whether JLWOP is appropriate: (1) the juvenile’s “age and
its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and
failure to appreciate risks and consequences”; (2) “the family and
home environment that surrounds him”; (3) “the circumstances of
the homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the
conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected
him”; (4) the possibility “that he might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with
youth—for example, his inability to deal with police officers or
prosecutors . . . or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys”; and
(5) “the possibility of rehabilitation . . . .” 37 Miller left unclear what
procedures states should employ to carry out these requirements, but
the Court ruled that mandatory JLWOP sentences were unconstitutional. 38
Lastly, the Court evaluated the application of Miller retroactively “to juvenile offenders whose convictions and sentences were
final when Miller was decided” in Montgomery v. Louisiana. 39 The
defendant in Montgomery was seventeen years old at the time that
he killed a deputy sheriff. 40 Montgomery argued Miller permitted
him to seek collateral review of his mandatory JLWOP sentence after almost fifty years in custody. 41 The Court agreed and held that
“Miller announced a substantive rule that is retroactive in cases on
collateral review.” 42 It explained that Miller barred only mandatory
JLWOP sentences, but a juvenile offender could still receive a
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

Id. at 472.
Id. at 480.
Id. at 477–78.
See id. at 489.
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 194 (2016).
Id.
Id. at 726–27.
Id. at 732.
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discretionary JLWOP sentence if the homicide offense reflects “permanent incorrigibility” rather than “transient immaturity.” 43 In making this individualized assessment of the juvenile’s youth, circumstances, and background, the sentencing court “separate[s] those juveniles who may be sentenced to life without parole from those who
may not.” 44
It is important to clarify several concepts embedded in this precedent. Mandatory JLWOP sentences are automatically imposed on
offenders and prevent the sentencing court from even considering
youth and “whether the law’s harshest term of imprisonment proportionately punishes a juvenile offender.” 45 In contrast, discretionary JLWOP sentences involve an assessment of mitigating factors,
such as the level of immaturity, the circumstances surrounding the
crime, and the possibility of rehabilitation, before selecting life
without parole as the appropriate penalty. 46 It seems that these same
factors also lead to an implicit permanent incorrigibility determination, which is problematic for the reasons addressed below. 47
Before Jones, states were divided over whether a sentencing
court must make an express determination of permanent incorrigibility.48 Seven state supreme courts have held that the sentencing
authority must find a juvenile permanently incorrigible before sentencing them to life without parole. 49 On the other hand, four state
supreme courts hold that the sentencing authority is not required to
find a juvenile permanently incorrigible before sentencing them to

Id. at 734.
Id. at 735.
45
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 474 (2012).
46
See id. at 477–78.
47
See discussion infra Part IV.
48
Alice Reichman Hoesterey, Confusion in Montgomery’s Wake: State Responses, the Mandates of Montgomery, and Why a Complete Categorical Ban on
Life without Parole for Juveniles is the Only Constitutional Option, 45 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 149, 161 (2017).
49
See Davis v. State, 415 P.3d 666, 695–96 (Wyo. 2018); People v. Holman,
91 N.E.3d 849, 863 (Ill. 2017); Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410, 459 (Pa.
2017); State v. Valencia, 386 P.3d 392, 396 (Ariz. 2016); Landrum v. State, 192
So. 3d 459, 467–69 (Fla. 2016); Veal v. State, 784 S.E.2d 403, 411–12 (Ga. 2016);
State v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545, 558 (Iowa 2015).
43
44
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life without parole. 50 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on this
precise issue on March 9, 2020, in Jones. 51
B.

The Abolition of JLWOP by State Courts and Legislatures
The JLWOP precedent only remains applicable in the states that
have not already eliminated JLWOP through litigation or legislation. After Miller and the growing awareness of adolescent development, twenty-five states and the District of Columbia have abolished
life without parole sentences for juveniles. 52 These laws replace
JLWOP with parole eligibility or a petition for sentence modification after a certain period of incarceration, but only some apply retroactively. 53 For example, Virginia enacted a new law in February
of 2020 that provides: “[A]ny person sentenced to a term of life imprisonment for a single felony or multiple felonies committed while
the person was a juvenile and who has served at least 20 years of
such sentence shall be eligible for parole . . . .” 54 State supreme
courts also eliminated JLWOP on the grounds that this excessively
harsh punishment violated their state constitutions. 55 The movement
to ban JLWOP through state legislation or litigation validates the
importance of creating age-appropriate sentencing schemes that
comply with both the U.S. Constitution and the brain and behavioral
science of minors. 56
See People v. Skinner, 917 N.W.2d 292, 309 (Mich. 2018); Chandler v.
State, 242 So. 3d 65, 69–70 (Miss. 2018); Johnson v. State, 395 P.3d 1246, 1258
(Idaho 2017); State v. Ramos, 387 P.3d 650, 665 (Wash. 2017).
51
Jones v. Mississippi, 140 S. Ct. 1293, 1293 (2020).
52
States that Ban Life without Parole for Children, CAMPAIGN FOR FAIR
SENT’G YOUTH, https://cfsy.org/media-resources/states-that-ban-juvenile-lifewithout-parole/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2021) (illustrating the states that banned
JLWOP, allow for JLWOP but have no inmate serving the sentence, and allow
for JLWOP but have at least one inmate serving the sentence).
53
Legislation Eliminating Life-Without-Parole Sentences for Juveniles, JUV.
SENT’G PROJECT, https://juvenilesentencingproject.org/legislation-eliminatinglwop/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2021) (explaining the legislation passed and state court
decisions eliminating JLWOP).
54
2020 Va. Legis. Serv. 14 (West) (amending the limitation on the application of parole statutes in § 53.1–165.1(B), compiled in House Bill 35).
55
See e.g., Diatchenko v. District Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270,
284–85 (Mass. 2013).
56
See Josh Rovner, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Overview, SENT’G
PROJECT (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/juve
50
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II.

PERMANENT INCORRIGIBILITY BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
In 2004, Brett Jones had recently moved in with his grandparents
in Mississippi “to escape his mother and stepfather’s troubled
household in Florida.” 57 Within a month of turning fifteen years old,
Brett and his grandfather, Bertis Jones, started arguing after Bertis
found Brett’s girlfriend in Brett’s bedroom. 58 After some words
were exchanged, Bertis advanced towards Brett, who grabbed a
knife out of fear and stabbed Bertis eight times. 59 Bertis died, and
Brett was charged with murder. 60
The Circuit Court of Lee County, Mississippi, convicted Brett
for the murder of his grandfather and sentenced him to life imprisonment without parole, which was the obligatory penalty for murder. 61 The Court of Appeals of Mississippi affirmed the sentence in
2006. 62 Brett petitioned for postconviction relief following the Miller decision, and the Supreme Court of Mississippi vacated his life
without parole sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. 63
Specifically, the court’s instructions directed the lower circuit court
“to take into account characteristics and circumstances unique to juveniles.” 64 In resentencing Brett to life without parole in 2015, the
circuit court did not expressly find Brett permanently incorrigible
but rather assessed the mitigating and aggravating circumstances. 65
While the state offered no new evidence at the resentencing hearing,
Brett put on six witnesses that testified to his mental health conditions at the time of the murder, his feelings of remorse and regret,
and his good record in prison. 66 In 2017, the Mississippi Court of
nile-life-without-parole/ (“Research on adolescent brain development confirms
the commonsense understanding that children are different from adults in ways
that are critical to identifying age appropriate criminal sentences.”).
57
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2, Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307
(2021) (No. 18-1259).
58
Id.
59
Id. at 2–3.
60
Id. at 3.
61
Jones v. State, 938 So. 2d 312, 313–15 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).
62
Id. at 313.
63
Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698, 699–700, 703 (Miss. 2013).
64
Id. at 702.
65
Appendix E to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 71a, 74a, 76a, Jones v.
Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021) (No. 18-1259).
66
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3–4, Jones, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (No. 181259).
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Appeals affirmed his resentencing and rejected Brett’s argument
that a specific finding of permanent incorrigibility is required of the
sentencing judge under Miller. 67 Brett appealed to the Supreme
Court of Mississippi on the grounds that the lack of a permanent
incorrigibility finding made his sentence unconstitutional.68 The
court granted certiorari but then dismissed his petition. 69
On March 9, 2020, the Supreme Court of the United States
granted Brett’s petition for writ of certiorari. 70 The question presented before the Court was “[w]hether the Eighth Amendment requires the sentencing authority to make a finding that a juvenile is
permanently incorrigible before imposing a sentence of life without
parole.” 71
Brett argued that sentencing a juvenile homicide offender to life
without parole required a finding that he was permanently incorrigible. 72 Specifically, Brett contended that the rule that governed his
case was articulated in Miller: “The Eighth Amendment prohibits
life-without-parole sentences for juvenile homicide offenders unless
their crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.” 73 This permanent incorrigibility rule in Miller and Montgomery essentially banned a
punishment for a group of offenders, thereby implicitly requiring a
court to first determine whether the defendant was a member of the
class of exempted offenders. 74 Therefore, Brett requested that the
Court “vacate the sentence and remand the case so Mississippi’s
courts can determine whether Brett is the rare, permanently incorrigible juvenile homicide offender who may be sentenced to life without parole.” 75
The state of Mississippi argued that “the Eighth Amendment requires only that a sentencer consider the mitigating circumstances
of youth and its attendant characteristics before imposing a life
Appendix C to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 32a, 41a–42a, Jones, 141
S. Ct. 1307 (No. 18-1259).
68
Brief for Petitioner at 12, Jones, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (No. 18-1259).
69
Appendix A to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 1a, Jones, 141 S. Ct. 1307
(No. 18-1259).
70
Jones v. Mississippi, 140 S. Ct. 1293, 1293 (2020).
71
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Jones, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (No. 18-1259).
72
Brief for Petitioner at 14, Jones, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (No. 18-1259).
73
Id. at 13.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 15.
67
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without parole sentence on a juvenile homicide offender.” 76 In particular, Mississippi cited language in Montgomery that clarified that
Miller “‘did not require trial courts to make a finding of fact regarding a child’s incorrigibility.’” 77 Instead, Miller established individualized sentencing, which considers the offender’s youth and related
characteristics—rather than a finding of permanent incorrigibility—
as the constitutional requirement for imposing JLWOP. 78 Further,
Miller invalidated only mandatory JLWOP, not the discretionary
JLWOP at issue in Brett’s case. 79 Mississippi maintained that the
judgment of the Mississippi Court of Appeals resentencing Brett to
life without parole should be affirmed. 80
In a 6–3 opinion, authored by Justice Brett Kavanaugh on April
22, 2021, the Supreme Court affirmed the Mississippi Court of Appeals’ decision and held that a separate factual finding of permanent
incorrigibility is not required before sentencing a defendant who
committed a homicide before the age of 18 to life without parole. 81
The majority rejected Jones’s argument in light of the explicit language in Miller, which “mandated ‘only that a sentencer follow a
certain process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant
characteristics—before imposing’ a life-without-parole sentence.” 82
In “squarely reject[ing] such a requirement,” the Court found “a
State’s discretionary sentencing system is both constitutionally necessary and constitutionally sufficient.” 83
Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the conclusion “that the
Eighth Amendment does not require a finding that a minor be permanently incorrigible as a prerequisite to a sentence of life without
parole,” but he raised several critiques of the Court’s JLWOP precedent, specifically Montgomery. 84 Most relevant to this Comment,
Justice Thomas highlighted two irreconcilable points in Miller and
Montgomery. 85 First, Montgomery’s acknowledgment that Miller
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85

Brief for Respondent at 15, Jones, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (No. 18-1259).
Id. at 14 (citing Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 211 (2016)).
Id. at 23.
Id. at 24, 33–34.
Id. at 50.
Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1311, 1318–19 (2021).
Id. (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 483 (2012)).
Id. at 1313–14.
Id. at 1323 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 1323–26.
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did not categorically bar JLWOP for a class of offenders is inharmonious with Montgomery’s conclusion later in the opinion that
Miller prohibited JLWOP “‘for all but the rarest juvenile offenders,
those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.’” 86 Secondly,
while Montgomery decided that “‘trial courts [need not] make a
finding of fact regarding a child’s incorrigibility,’” it also determined that “‘Miller drew a line between children whose crimes reflect transient immaturity and those rare children whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption.’” 87 In Justice Thomas’s opinion, Montgomery should be overruled “in both name and substance.” 88
Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, writing that the Court’s decision in Jones was “an abrupt break from precedent.” 89 Justice Sotomayor disagreed with the majority’s fixation on the single statement in Montgomery. 90 While the Court’s prior decisions do not require a particular procedure or any “magic words” to consider a defendant’s youth in sentencing decisions, it does mandate that a sentencer determine whether a juvenile’s crime reflects transient immaturity or irreparable corruption because “[n]o set of discretionary
sentencing procedures can render a sentence of LWOP constitutional for a juvenile whose crime reflects ‘unfortunate yet transient
immaturity.’” 91
III.

THE SCIENCE, RESEARCH, AND BEHAVIOR OF ADOLESCENTS
Many scientists and researchers from various fields have explored this dynamic period of human development known as adolescence. 92 Such research has not only become critical for parents,
caregivers, and medical professionals but also for lawyers, judges,
and juries. It is important to keep in mind that (1) this is a relatively
new area of study with relatively new research, meaning there are
opportunities for it to improve; and (2) science and scientific studies
Id. at 1325 (quoting Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 211 (2016)).
Id. (quoting Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 209).
88
Id. at 1328.
89
Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
90
Id.at 1330. The statement in question is: “Miller did not impose a formal
factfinding requirement . . . .” Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 211.
91
Id. at 1331–32 (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012)).
92
See discussion infra Section III.A–E.
86
87
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have their intrinsic limitations, such as correlation does not signify
causation. 93 Nevertheless, the scientific and technological advancements have revealed fascinating knowledge about adolescent development that is so powerful and conclusive that it has contributed to
Supreme Court decisions. 94 Through the biological processes and
studies presented in the subsequent sections, the science behind the
adolescent brain will demonstrate that a determination of permanent
incorrigibility for a juvenile is not logically plausible. 95
A.
Neurological Processes in Adolescence
The most groundbreaking research regarding the juvenile brain
occurred in neuroscience, specifically the process of neuroplasticity.
Neuroplasticity is “the brain’s ability to form and reorganize connections between neurons in response to changes in behavior and
environment.” 96 This plasticity observed by researchers highlights
how particular activities can drive structural changes in the brain,
and such structural changes occur “well into adulthood.”97
93
See, e.g., Sara B. Johnson et al., Adolescent Maturity and the Brain: The
Promise and Pitfalls of Neuroscience Research in Adolescent Health Policy, 45
J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 216, 216, 218–19 (2009).
94
See discussion supra Section I.A.
95
See discussion infra Part IV.
96
SOCIETY FOR NEUROSCIENCE, BRAIN FACTS 58 (Lisa Chiu et al. eds., 8th
ed. 2018). The individual’s surrounding environment and experience contributes
to this brain maturation. Id. at 52. Experience-expectant plasticity is the molding
and adapting of the brain as a result of normal environmental stimuli. Id. For example, hearing language at a young age will shape the normal development of the
child’s ability to speak and understand language. See id. Experience-dependent
plasticity refers to the continual development of specific regions of the brain as a
result of particular life experiences. Id. For example, “violinists often show
greater cortical development in the brain region associated with the fingers of their
left hand.” Id.
97
Katherine Woollett & Eleanor A. Maguire, Acquiring “the Knowledge” of
London’s Layout Drives Structural Brain Changes, 21 CURRENT BIOLOGY 2109,
2112 (2011). For example, a four-year study on London taxi drivers was conducted to evaluate the structural brain changes that occur with certain “biologically relevant behaviors engaging higher cognitive functions.” Id. at 2109. In order to qualify for an operating license from the taxi-licensing agency, a trainee
must learn London’s complex and irregular layout. Id. Researchers tracked the
gray matter volume in their brains, particularly in the posterior hippocampi, between the trainees who qualified as London taxi drivers and the trainees who
failed to pass this spatial learning exercise. Id. at 2111. Structural magnetic
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Consequently, the experiences that one lives impact the connections
that are formed by the neurons. 98 However, there is a danger to such
malleability: an increase in “an individual’s vulnerability toward
making improper decisions because the brain’s region-specific neurocircuitry remains under construction, thus making it difficult to
think critically and rationally before making complex decisions.” 99
Adolescence is marked by remarkable brain growth, including a
surge in the number of neurons and synaptic connections. 100 To
maximize efficiency and electric transmissions with all of these new
“energetically costly” synapses, a white, fatty sheath insulates certain parts of the neurons. 101 This process, known as myelination,
heightens noticeably during adolescence, significantly increases the
speed of the electrical transmission along the neuron, and decreases
the energy required to maintain this rapid information flow across
the brain. 102
Not all brain changes occurring in the teenage years are expansive, with synaptic pruning “being a hallmark of the brain transformations of adolescence.” 103 Pruning is the mechanism by which unused synapses are eliminated to assist in the rewiring of the brain
into a more efficient organ. 104 These aspects of neuroplasticity and
resonance imaging (“MRI”) brain scans revealed that the qualified trainees experienced an increase in gray matter volume in their posterior hippocampi whereas
the non-qualified trainees demonstrated no significant differences in gray matter
volume. Id.
98
See SOCIETY FOR NEUROSCIENCE, supra note 96, at 46; see also Jill L. Kays
et al., The Dynamic Brain: Neuroplasticity and Mental Health, 24 J.
NEUROPSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCES 118, 119 (2012) (emphasizing
the “importance of activity-level or demand in evoking remodeling”).
99
Mariam Arain et al., Maturation of the Adolescent Brain, 9
NEUROPSYCHIATRIC DISEASE TREATMENT 449, 451 (2013); see also Kays et al.,
supra note 98, at 119 (noting that changes in the brain that occur with neuroplasticity “can be either adaptive or maladaptive”).
100
See Arain et al., supra note 99, at 451. Scientific studies have illustrated
that the rates of formation of new neurons are four to five times higher during
adolescence than adulthood. Linda P. Spear, Adolescent Neurodevelopment, 52 J.
ADOLESCENT HEALTH 7, 10 (2013) (citing studies about decreasing neurogenesis
in brain maturation between adolescence and adulthood).
101
Spear, supra note 100, at 8.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Arain et al., supra note 99, at 452; see also Spear, supra note 100, at 8
(explaining that the brain will produce more neurons and synaptic connections
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brain maturity are important considerations in the juvenile sentencing scheme because they illustrate “the potential for significant personal change in response to environment” 105 and the higher likelihood that their teenage deficiencies will be reformed if given the
chance.
The brain is constantly changing, both structurally and functionally, during adolescence. 106 But when does the brain fully mature?
Neuroscience research indicates that the human brain continues to
develop until about the age of thirty with different brain regions
growing at different rates. 107 MRI studies discovered that the maturational brain process follows a back-to-front pattern, hence why the
limbic system develops earlier and the prefrontal cortex develops
last. 108 The importance of these two regions and their developmental
trajectories in the juvenile sentencing context is explained below.
than will ultimately be retained after these waves of brain expansion and regression) (citations omitted). The birth of neurons, the growth in number of synapses,
and the paring back of the unused connections causes adolescence to be one of
the most dynamic aspects of human development, “second only to infancy in
terms of the rate of developmental changes that can occur within the brain.” Arain
et al., supra note 99, at 451; see also Spear, supra note 100, at 10 (“Synapses in
the adolescent brain are notably more dynamic than they are in adulthood, with
axons growing and retracting and new synapses being formed and others eliminated at notably greater rates than seen in the mature brain.” (citations omitted)).
105
Hanan, supra note 8, at 174.
106
See discussion supra Section III.A.
107
Id.; Cohen et al., supra note 1, at 783 (“Specifically, noninvasive brain
imaging and postmortem studies have shown continued regional development of
the prefrontal cortex, implicated in judgment and self-control beyond the teen
years and into the twenties.” (citations omitted)); Arain et al., supra note 99, at
456 (“Behavioral control requires a great involvement of cognitive and executive
functions. These functions are localized in the prefrontal cortex, which matures
independent of puberty and continues to evolve up until 24 years of age.”); Johnson et al., supra note 93, at 216 (“The frontal lobes, home to key components of
the neural circuitry underlying ‘executive functions’ such as planning, working
memory, and impulse control, are among the last areas of the brain to mature; they
may not be fully developed until halfway through the third decade of life.” (citations omitted)); Sarah-Jayne Blakemore & Suparna Choudhury, Development of
the Adolescent Brain: Implications for Executive Function and Social Cognition,
47 J. CHILD PSYCH. & PSYCHIATRY 296, 300 (2006) (“Recent MRI studies indicate that the time at which the brain reaches maturity may be much later than the
end of adolescence.”).
108
Arain et al., supra note 99, at 453 (“These findings have led to the concept
of frontalization, whereby the prefrontal cortex develops in order to regulate the
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B.
Balancing Frontal and Limbic Brain Regions
The neurological and structural changes observed in the prefrontal cortex and the limbic system are especially pertinent to understanding youth conduct and misconduct. First, the prefrontal cortex
is the brain’s executive control system responsible for decision making, planning, self-regulation, problem solving, and attention. 109
These higher-order cognitive processes “allow an individual to
pause long enough to take stock of a situation, assess his or her options, plan a course of action, and execute it.” 110 MRI studies provide insight into the reconfiguration of the prefrontal cortex when
showing that teenagers have less white matter in their frontal lobes
than adults, but white matter increases throughout adolescence. 111
Because “[m]yelin appears white in MRI scans,” the positive relationship between white matter and age has been understood as reflecting a surge in myelination. 112 Accordingly, increasing myelination and synaptic pruning refine the prefrontal cortex during this
time period, which in turn is believed to cause improvements in executive functioning. 113
behavioral responses initiated by the limbic structures.”); see also Catherine A.
Hartley & Leah H. Somerville, The Neuroscience of Adolescent Decision-Making,
5 CURRENT OP. BEHAV. SCIENCES 108, 109 (2015) (detailing the impact of the
staggered trajectories of neurodevelopment on the decision-making process).
109
SOCIETY FOR NEUROSCIENCE, supra note 96, at 34.
110
Johnson et al., supra note 93, at 217.
111
Arain et al., supra note 99, at 453 (citations omitted). Other researchers
consistently found an increase in white matter in the frontal and parietal cortex of
adolescent brains as compared to younger children’s brains. Blakemore &
Choudhury, supra note 107, at 297–98. In one particular MRI study, researchers
scanned the brains of a group of children averaging nine years old and a group of
adolescents averaging fourteen years old. Id. at 297. The density of white and grey
matter differed greatly: “The results showed a higher volume of white matter in
the frontal cortex and parietal cortex in the older children than in the younger
group. The younger group, by contrast, had a higher volume of grey matter in the
same regions.” Id. at 297–98.
112
Blakemore & Choudhury, supra note 107, at 298. More studies with larger
subject groups have since been conducted to confirm the notion that the increased
myelination during adolescence is linked to an increase in white matter. Id.
113
Laurence Steinberg, Cognitive and Affective Development in Adolescence,
9 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCIENCES 69, 70 (2005) (citing studies of adolescent cognitive development and their implications). Behavioral studies additionally
demonstrated that inhibitory control, processing speed, and decision-making task
performance further develops through adolescence. Blakemore & Choudhury,
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While the prefrontal cortex deals with the rational parts of life,
the limbic system manages the irrational aspects. 114 The amygdala,
a limbic structure, “plays a central role in emotional learning, particularly within the context of fear.” 115 A study observed what parts
of the brain were activated when adolescents and adults viewed
faces with various emotional expressions. 116 Results showed that
adolescents tended to activate the amygdala more than adults when
viewing faces with fearful expressions. 117 In contrast, when asked
to focus on a non-emotional characteristic of the face, such as the
length of the nose, “adults, but not adolescents, selectively engaged
and disengaged” areas in the prefrontal cortex. 118 Adolescents seem
to rely more on their limbic system when perceiving the outside
world, whereas cerebral maturation permits adults to rely less on this
emotional response-based system. 119
The limbic system is also linked to arousal and motivation, such
that teenagers are wired to seek and respond to rewards. 120 Many
imaging studies have illustrated this “heightened activity in limbic
regions of the brain during the teen years to cues of potential threat,
rewards, and peers.” 121 One study analyzed the relationship between
rewards and the nucleus accumbens (“NAcc”), a site in the limbic
supra note 107, at 301 (citing studies detailing the relationship between executive
function abilities and the developing prefrontal cortex); see also Johnson et al.,
supra note 93, at 217 (“Although young children can demonstrate impulse control
skills, with age and neuromaturation (e.g., pruning and myelination), comes the
ability to consistently use these skills.” (citations omitted)).
114
See Blakemore & Choudhury, supra note 107, at 306.
115
SOCIETY FOR NEUROSCIENCE, supra note 96, at 123.
116
Blakemore & Choudhury, supra note 107, at 307. Adolescents ranged from
ages seven to seventeen, and adults ranged from twenty-five to thirty-six years
old. Id.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
See id.
120
See SOCIETY FOR NEUROSCIENCE, supra note 96, at 82 (“[T]he brain’s reward system generates habits and learned behaviors: When a reward (a delicious
food or a high-inducing drug) generates feelings of pleasure, we learn to repeat
the actions that led to that reward.”).
121
Cohen et al., supra note 1, at 784 (citations omitted); see also Adriana Galvan, Adolescent Development of the Reward System, 4 FRONTIERS HUMAN
NEUROSCIENCE 1, 7 (2010) (“The investigations described in this review . . . show
strong support for the hypothesis that the dopamine system is hyper-responsive,
or over-engaged, in response to rewards during adolescence.”).
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system controlling reward behavior. 122 Child, adolescent, and adult
participants performed a gambling task where they guessed if a coin
toss would land on heads or tails, and they won money if they
guessed correctly and lost money if they guessed incorrectly. 123 Results indicated a higher NAcc response to rewarding outcomes in
adolescents than children or adults. 124 Researchers understand these
behavioral patterns to reflect that the adolescent “brain’s emotional
processing and cognitive appraisal systems” are still striving to master top-down control of the prefrontal cortex over the limbic system. 125
Nevertheless, the prefrontal cortex and the limbic region are not
isolated systems; rather, they overlap and interconnect during the
reconstruction process of the adolescent brain. 126 According to the
imbalance model of adolescence, as the individual gathers experiences, the connections between these regions are strengthened in
such a way that the prefrontal cortex dominates the emotional center
of the brain. 127 These increasingly dense connections “integrate
emotional and cognitive processes and result in what is often considered to be ‘emotional maturity’ (e.g., the ability to regulate and
to interpret emotions).” 128 Consequently, adolescent brains begin to
Barbara R. Braams et al., Longitudinal Changes in Adolescent Risk-Taking: A Comprehensive Study of Neural Responses to Rewards, Pubertal Development, and Risk-Taking Behavior, J. NEUROSCIENCE 7226, 7226 (2015).
123
Id. at 7226–27.
124
See id. at 7237.
125
See Blakemore & Choudhury, supra note 107, at 307.
126
See Steinberg, supra note 113, at 71.
127
Cohen et al., supra note 1, at 783–84 (“With development and experience,
connections between these regions are strengthened enabling the prefrontal cortex
to ‘override’ the emotional centers of the brain to diminish emotionally triggered
behavior in favor of goal-oriented or socially acceptable behavior.”) This type of
“tension is presumably not observed in childhood because of a relative lack of
maturity of these systems or in adulthood because of the relative maturity of these
brain regions (i.e., balanced).” Id.
128
Johnson et al., supra note 93, at 218 (noting that multiple researchers “have
hypothesized that a temporal gap between the development of the socioemotional
system of the brain (which experiences an early developmental surge around puberty) and the cognitive control system of the brain (which extends through late
adolescence) underlies some aspects of risk-taking behavior” (citations omitted)).
Animal studies have also suggested that the amygdala and the frontal lobe witness
a proliferation of neural connections between the two regions, particularly during
adolescence but continuing until adulthood. Id. at 217–18 (citations omitted).
122
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encourage mature behavior and diminish emotionally-charged responses as the prefrontal cortex gradually overpowers the limbic
system. 129
Before the brain achieves this equilibrium, cognitive capacity is
still at the mercy of emotion until at least young adulthood. 130 To
test the limbic system’s influence on the prefrontal cortex in emotional situations, researchers utilized emotional expressions, such as
smiling, fearful, or neutral faces. 131 The results showed that young
adults behaved more similarly to adolescents by demonstrating
poorer cognitive control and less prefrontal cortex engagement in
response to emotionally-triggered contexts. 132 Their findings parallel the “relatively protracted development of the prefrontal cortex
into the early twenties.” 133 Therefore, the “immature engagement of
prefrontal regions that are important for overriding emotionally triggered actions” reflects adolescents’ weaker cognitive capacity. 134
Scientific discoveries like this one provide empirical support that the
See Cohen et al., supra note 1, at 783–84. In addition to the enhanced emotion regulation, the coordination of affect and cognition improves as a result of
“the increased connectivity between regions associated with the socio-emotional
and cognitive control systems.” Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Sensation Seeking and Impulsivity as Indexed by Behavior and Self-Report: Evidence
for a Dual Systems Model, 44 DEV. PSYCH. 1764, 1765 (2008).
130
See Cohen et al., supra note 1, at 787 (“This diminished capacity is paralleled by immature engagement of prefrontal regions that are important for overriding emotionally triggered actions.”); see also L.P. Spear, The Adolescent Brain
and Age-Related Behavioral Manifestations, 24 NEUROSCIENCE &
BIOBEHAVIORAL REVS. 417, 440 (2000) (“Age-specific differences in amygdala
activity in human adolescents versus adults were reported in a recent functional
MRI study. In this intriguing preliminary report, adolescents were reported to exhibit greater brain activity in the amygdala than in the frontal lobe when engaged
in a task requiring the subjects to identify emotional state from facial expressions,
while adults conversely exhibited greater activation in frontal lobe than amygdala
when engaged in the same task.”) (citations omitted).
131
Id. at 785–86. Researchers focused on three age groups: thirteen to seventeen-year-olds (children), eighteen to twenty-one-year-olds (adolescents), and
twenty-two to twenty-five-year-olds (young adults). Id. at 785. Researchers also
tested the impact of prolonged emotional states on cognitive control by having
participants engage in “the cognitive control task while anticipating a negative
event (loud aversive noise), positive event (winning up to $100), or no event.” Id.
at 786.
132
Id. at 785–86.
133
Id.
134
Id. at 787.
129
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influence of emotion on decision-making and judgments diminishes
with maturity, thereby making a juvenile’s response to stimuli subject to change––quite the opposite of a permanent quality.
C.

Typical Teenage Behaviors as Manifestations of
Neurological Processes
Given that one cannot observe these structural and functional
changes in the brain with the naked eye, it is important to highlight
how the neurological processes tend to manifest in the real world. 135
Coordinating these internal processes with their outward manifestations elucidates the connection between what teenagers experience
in their brains and what society labels as typical adolescent conduct. 136 A better understanding of how certain juvenile behavior relates to their neurological makeup will draw attention to the illogical
nature of permanent incorrigibility in the juvenile sentencing context.
First, impulsivity and sensation seeking increase during adolescence 137 and have been associated with the changing cognitive and
emotional systems during this time period. 138 While impulsivity is
See Johnson et al., supra note 93, at 218 (“Studying the link between behavioral changes and brain changes has been greatly facilitated by recent advances
in neuroimaging technology and behavioral assessments. One challenge has been
to identify the fundamental units of emotion and cognition and how they combine
to determine more complicated ‘real-world’ behaviors.”).
136
See Arain et al., supra note 99, at 454 (“Hence, acquiring knowledge regarding adolescent brain maturation can help understand why teens take risks,
while keeping in mind that risk-taking behavior is a normal and necessary component of adolescence.”).
137
See Spear, supra note 130, at 421 (“Relative to individuals at other ages,
human adolescents as a group exhibit a disproportionate amount of reckless behavior, sensation seeking and risk taking . . . .”).
138
Steinberg et al., supra note 129, at 1776 (“The first half of the adolescent
decade—between 10 and 15—appears to be a time of growing vulnerability to
risky behavior, as this period is characterized by relatively higher sensation seeking in the context of relatively lower impulse control; heightened sensation seeking impels adolescent toward risky activity, and immature self-regulatory capabilities do not restrain this impulse.”); Spear, supra note 130, at 417 (“Certain
behavioral features common among adolescents of a variety of species may have
evolved to promote attainment of the necessary skills for independence; these agerelated behaviors, such as an adolescent-associated increase in risk taking, may
be promoted less by increases in pubertal hormones than by developmental events
occurring in brain during adolescence.”).
135
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the “lack of self-control or deficiencies in response inhibition,” sensation seeking describes “the tendency to seek out novel, varied, and
highly stimulating experiences, and the willingness to take risks in
order to attain them.” 139 Recent research on adolescent risk-taking
showed that sensation seeking increases until around age sixteen and
then declines steadily; impulse control increases throughout adolescence and adulthood; and impulsivity declines or remains stable in
the twenty-year period of the study. 140 These findings, consistent
with other neurobiological evidence, suggest a “dramatic remodeling of reward circuitry early in adolescence but a lengthier period of
more gradual maturation of brain systems implicated in self-regulation.” 141 In other words, the emotion-based system that promotes
impulsive and risky behaviors undergoes reconstruction while the
cognitive-based system slowly matures to encourage self-regulatory
conduct. 142 Therefore, how a juvenile behaves during adolescence
may not be determinative of how they will behave later on given that
their brain circuitry is continuing to refine and not expected to fully
mature until years later. 143
139
Steinberg et al., supra note 129, at 1765 (“Not all impulsivity leads to stimulating or even rewarding experiences (e.g., impulsively deciding to end a friendship), and not all sensation seeking is done impulsively (e.g., purchasing advance
tickets to ride a roller coaster or sky dive).”).
140
Id. at 1771, 1774. In this study, there were 935 participants ranging from
age ten and thirty. Id. at 1766. Along with other self-report measures, questionnaires, and tasks, a computerized Tower of London task measured impulsivity and
a computerized version of the driving game “Stoplight” assessed sensation seeking. Id. at 1767 (providing further details about the procedures involved in each
measure).
141
Id. at 1774.
142
See Ivy N. Defor et al., Heightened Adolescent Risk-Taking? Insights from
Lab Studies on Age Differences in Decision-Making, 6 POL’Y INSIGHTS FROM
BEHAV. & BRAIN SCIENCES 56, 58–59 (2019) (“Accordingly, in emotionally
arousing ‘hot’ contexts (e.g., a situation with a potential reward), adolescents’ hyperresponsive reward processing system overrides the cognitive control system,
ultimately increasing risk-taking. Thus, these [neurodevelopmental imbalance]
models posit that emotions affect risk-taking, particularly for adolescents, and that
adolescents are less capable of top-down cognitive control than adults but more
emotionally influenced than both children and adults.”).
143
See Spear, supra note 130, at 421 (“Fortunately, however, adolescent experimentation in risk taking is transient for most individuals, with the vast majority of adolescents surviving the lottery for negative outcome they enter by engaging in risk taking.”).
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Second, teen risk-taking is fueled by their susceptibility to peer
influence. 144 It is widely accepted that peers influence each other
and that the pressure of peer influences are stronger during adolescence than adulthood. 145 The first of several studies to reveal the
strong effects of peer influence reported that adolescents’ risky
choices increased when in the presence of peers compared to
adults. 146 Researchers measured risk-taking in this study with a
video game that requires participants to decide whether to stop a car
that is driving towards a yellow traffic light. 147 Although participants took more risks during the game when in the presence of peers
versus alone, the effect of peer pressure varied with age. 148 Ultimately, risk-taking in group situations was more pronounced in the
adolescent age group than the older participants, suggesting that
“adolescents are more susceptible to the influence of their peers in
risky situations.” 149
In addition, studies have shown that susceptibility to peer pressure increases until about age fourteen and then declines with late
adolescence. 150 One report gathered data from three different studies
to evaluate how the age differences affect resistance to peer influence. 151 Researchers have found that “resistance to peer influence
See, e.g., Margo Gardner & Laurence Steinberg, Peer Influence on Risk
Taking, Risk Preference, and Risky Decision Making in Adolescence and Adulthood: An Experimental Study, 41 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCH. 625, 632 (2005).
145
Laurence Steinberg & Kathryn C. Monahan, Age Differences in Resistance
to Peer Influence, 43 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCH. 1531, 1531 (2007); Elizabeth S.
Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and the Regulation of Youth
Crime, 18 FUTURE CHILDREN 15, 20 (2008).
146
Gardner & Steinberg, supra note 144, at 632. This study tested the effects
of the presence of peers on adolescence risk taking, risk preference, and risky
decision making. Id. at 626. Adolescents ranged from thirteen to sixteen years old,
young adults ranged from eighteen to twenty-two years old, and adults were
twenty-four or more years old. Id.
147
Id. at 627. Participants completed this task alone and in the presence of
peers. Id. at 628. A modification of this game was used for in the aforementioned
study investigating impulsivity and sensation seeking in adolescence. See Steinberg et al., supra note 129, at 1768.
148
Gardner & Steinberg, supra note 144, at 629–30.
149
Id. at 632.
150
Scott & Steinberg, supra note 145, at 20.
151
Steinberg & Monahan, supra note 145, at 1532–33. The MacArthur Juvenile Competence Study, the MacArthur Juvenile Capacity Study, and Research on
Pathways to Desistance provided the data for the present study. Id. at 1533. In
144
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increases linearly over the course of adolescence, especially between ages 14 and 18.” 152 This decline in susceptibility and increase
in resistance to peer influence can be attributed to the maturation
process of the brain, which permits “cognitively developed adolescents and adults to remove themselves from situations that may be
dangerous or morally toxic.” 153 Juveniles at the time of committing
crimes are extremely vulnerable to peer pressure, but that is yet another characteristic of adolescence, and it weakens significantly as
the individual grows up. 154
Lastly, the constantly developing brain of an adolescent makes
their character and personality traits unstable. 155 Adolescence is
known for its exploratory phases, allowing teens to experiment with
their self-expression, attitudes, and beliefs, until they settle into a
comfortable identity. 156 Recent research confirmed that personality
traits of an individual develop all through adulthood, even into old

particular, resistance to peer influence was measured through ten statements (i.e.,
“‘Some people go along with their friends just to keep their friends happy’ BUT
‘Other people refuse to go along with that their friends want to do, even though
they know it will make their friends unhappy’”), which asked the participants to
choose the best descriptor and whether the description is “really true” or “sort of
true.” Id. at 1535 (noting that after coding the responses on a scale, “[h]igher
scores indicate[d] greater resistance to peer influence”).
152
Id. at 1538.
153
Ashley Kloepfer, Denial of Hope: Sentencing Children to Life in Prison
Without the Possibility of Parole, 26 J.C.R. & ECON. DEV. 387, 399 (2012); see
also Gardner & Steinberg, supra note 144, at 634 (“Moreover, our results suggest
that the psychosocial capacities that undergird the ability to resist peer pressure
may continue to develop throughout late adolescence and into early adulthood.”).
154
See, e.g., Kloepfer, supra note 153, at 399; Gardner & Steinberg, supra
note 144, at 634.
155
See, e.g., Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of
Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014–15 (2003).
156
See id. (“At least until late adolescence, individuals’ values, attitudes, beliefs, and plans are likely to be tentative and exploratory expressions rather than
enduring representations of personhood.”).
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age, 157 but young adulthood appears to be the most critical period. 158
Also, researchers found that the “experimentation typical of this developmental stage [adolescence]” is usually what contributes to juvenile crime, as opposed to “moral deficiencies reflecting bad character.” 159 The continuous psychological and biological changes experienced during adolescence highlight that a child’s character is
most certainly not fixed. 160
D.
Trajectory for Juvenile Crime
These growing neural connections and alterations in the brain
reinforce the adolescent behaviors that sometimes land them in a
157
Brent W. Roberts & Daniel Mroczek, Personality Trait Change in Adulthood, 17 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCH. SCI. 31, 33 (2008) (“[T]he direction of
change is clearly in the positive direction. With age, people become more confident, warm, responsible, and calm—or what some have described as socially mature . . . . Social maturity is equated with the capacity to become a productive and
involved contributor to society.” (citations omitted)); see also Elizabeth Cauffman
et al., Comparing the Stability of Psychopathy Scores in Adolescents Versus
Adults: How Often is “Fledgling Psychopathy” Misdiagnosed?, 22 PSYCH., PUB.
POL’Y, & L. 77, 79 (2016) (“Even in adulthood, traits exhibit some degree of
change.”).
158
Roberts & Mroczek, supra note 157, at 33 (“[M]ost mean-level personality-trait change occurs between the ages of 20 and 40.”).
159
Scott & Steinberg, supra note 145, at 24 (“Thus an impulsive adult whose
‘adolescent’ traits lead him to get involved in crime is quite different from a risktaking teen. Adolescent traits are not typical of adulthood. The values and preferences that motivate the adult criminal are not transitory, but fixed elements of
personal identity. This cannot be said of the crimes of typical juvenile offenders,
whose choices, while unfortunate, are shaped by developmental factors that are
constitutive of adolescence.”); Steinberg & Scott, supra note 155, at 1015 (“A
claim that an adult’s criminal act was out of character requires a demonstration
that his or her established character is good. The criminal choice of the typical
adolescent cannot be evaluated in this manner because the adolescent’s personal
identity is in flux and his or her character has not yet stabilized.”).
160
See Kloepfer, supra note 153, at 402 (“Nothing about a child’s character is
fixed. A child who gives into his or her impulses or makes unreasoned choices is
not a permanently flawed human being. Rather, this child will still develop biologically, cognitively, and psychosocially. Since children’s characters are not
fully established until adulthood, children have the unique capability to change
and to reform, if provided with that chance.”); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 570 (2005) (“The reality that juveniles still struggle to define their identity means it is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed
by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character.”).
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courtroom. What are the chances these minors find themselves in
the hands of law enforcement again? A new study conducted in Philadelphia found a re-arrest rate of 3.45% and a re-conviction rate of
merely 1.14% for juvenile lifers. 161 A separate report utilized data
from a more large-scale study, known as the Pathways to Desistance, and concluded that “within a sample of juvenile offenders
that is limited to those convicted of the most serious crimes, the percentage who continue to offend consistently at a high level is very
small.” 162 Other researchers reviewed the extensive line of research
pertaining to violent offending in criminal careers and concluded
that the majority of those convicted of a violent offense are “only
one-time violent offenders.” 163 In conjunction with the exceptionally low rates of recidivism for juvenile lifers, 164 it would appear
that most juveniles implicated in the JLWOP sentencing scheme desist from future crime. 165
More generally, age-crime curves illustrate that “the crime rate
increases from the minimum age of criminal responsibility to reach
161
Tarika Daftary-Kapur & Tina M. Zottoli, Resentencing of Juvenile Lifers:
The Philadelphia Experience, DEP’T JUST. STUD. FAC. SCHOLARSHIP & CREATIVE
WORKS 1, 10 (2020), https://digitalcommons.montclair.edu/justice-studies-facpubs/84. The authors of this report reviewed almost 300 cases of juveniles that
were resentenced in Philadelphia. Id. at 5. Only 174 juveniles were released as of
December 2019 when they were conducting their analyses. Id. at 10.
162
Edward P. Mulvey et al., Trajectories of Desistance and Continuity in Antisocial Behavior Following Court Adjudication among Serious Adolescent Offenders, 22 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 453, 468, 470 (2010) (“Much current law
and policy assumes that the vast majority of offenders at the more serious end of
the justice system are uniformly treading down the path of continued, high rate
offending. The results here present quite the opposite picture.”). In the present
study, the sample included 1,354 male adjudicated adolescents who were between
fourteen and less than eighteen years old at the time of their offense. Id. at 456.
The researchers conducted a baseline interview, followed by six follow-up interviews over the course of the subsequent three years, and used a modified version
of the Self-Report of Offending to measure self-reported criminal activity. Id. at
457–58.
163
Alex R. Piquero et al., Violence in Criminal Careers: A Review of the Literature from a Developmental Life-Course Perspective, 17 AGGRESSION &
VIOLENT BEHAV. 171, 176–77 (2012) (noting that “[t]here are very few recidivist
violent offenders”).
164
Daftary-Kapur & Zottoli, supra note 161, at 10.
165
See, e.g., Piquero et al., supra note 163, at 176–77; Mulvey et al., supra
note 162, at 468, 470.
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a peak in the teenage years; it then declines, at first quickly, but
[then] gradually more slowly.” 166 The previously mentioned review
of research on violent offenders and their criminal careers summarizes that “most youths who become violent do so in adolescence
and their violent involvement is limited to the late teens/early
20s.” 167 Some statistics even showed that “seventeen-year-olds
commit more crimes than any other age group—thereafter, the crime
rate declines steeply.” 168 Engagement in risk-taking also follows
this inverted U-shaped pattern, with risk-taking increasing until adolescence and then declining as individuals enter adulthood. 169
One explanation for this relationship between age and crime
takes a developmental approach to test the direct effect of age on
crime using data from a longitudinal study. 170 The researchers’ analyses showed that the age-crime curve is largely attributable to the
“co-occurring changes in sociological and psychological variables.” 171 Although varying hypotheses describe the trend, the reality
David P. Farrington, Age and Crime, 7 CRIME & JUST. 189, 189, 195 (1986)
(“In general, age-crime curves are unimodal (i.e., have only one peak) and peak
in the teenage years.”); see also Gary Sweeten et al., Age and the Explanation of
Crime, Revisited, 42 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 921, 922 (2013) (“Crime bears a
robust relationship with age, rapidly peaking in the late teen years, with a decline
nearly as rapid soon thereafter, and continued declines throughout adulthood.”).
167
Piquero et al., supra note 163, at 177 (noting an exception to this conclusion for “the use of self-report data, which tends to show a higher (and earlier)
incidence of violence”).
168
Scott & Steinberg, supra note 145, at 24 (“Most adolescents literally grow
out of their antisocial tendencies as individual identity becomes settled.”).
169
See, e.g., Steinberg et al., supra note 129, at 1776.
170
Sweeten et al., supra note 166, at 934–35 (“The current study responds to
the long-standing provocative claim that sociological and psychological variables
cannot explain why crime changes so predictably with age and that age has a direct but inexplicable effect on crime.”). In this seven year study, the participants
ranged from fourteen to eighteen years old and were convicted of a serious offense, such as felonies, sexual assault, or weapon offenses. Id. at 925 (“Although
not without shortcomings, these data provide a unique opportunity to investigate
how people change from adolescence to adulthood and how these changes explain
the relationship between age and crime.”). The uniqueness of this study lies in its
ability to control for changes in developmental and criminological perspectives,
which include variables like social control, psychosocial maturity, and rational
choice. See id. at 925–26.
171
Id. at 934–35. Researchers explained over three-fourths of the age-crime
relationship and 69% of the decrease in crime between the ages of fifteen and
twenty-five through sociological and psychological variables. Id. at 935.
166
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is that criminal activity increases during adolescence and decreases
as individuals reach adulthood. 172
E.

The Inexact Science of Predicting Juvenile Behavior and
Character
In prohibiting mandatory JLWOP, Miller created a sentencing
scheme for juvenile homicide offenders that practically rests upon a
prediction. 173 The Miller Court mandated sentencers to consider the
offender’s immaturity at the time of the crime, family and home life,
susceptibility to peer pressure, incompetencies in dealing with the
justice system, and potential for rehabilitation before imposing
JLWOP. 174 Although the issue of whether the Court explicitly requires a permanent incorrigibility determination was not decided until Jones, 175 the consensus was that the sentencer must at least consider the Miller factors to some (undetermined) extent. But this analysis alone necessarily comprises of an evaluation about future behavior, namely whether the juvenile will mature into a law-abiding
citizen or continue to grow their criminal record. 176 While the first
four factors are fixed because they rely on past events, the last factor
requires a type of predictive determination about a juvenile’s capacity to change in the future. 177
Although some may frame Miller and Montgomery as simply a
weighing of factors, ultimately, this balancing task involves predicting whether a juvenile will rehabilitate after serving their time in
See, e.g., id. at 921.
See Mary Marshall, Miller v. Alabama and the Problem of Prediction, 119
COLUM. L. REV. 1633, 1647 (2019).
174
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477–78 (2012).
175
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307
(2021) (No. 18-1259).
176
See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 72–73 (2010) (“To justify life without
parole on the assumption that the juvenile offender forever will be a danger to
society requires the sentencer to make a judgment that the juvenile is incorrigible.
The characteristics of juveniles make that judgment questionable.” (emphasis
added)).
177
See Marshall, supra note 173, at 1647 (“If the Court’s decision implied that
all five of these factors should be weighed evenly, then perhaps the fifth element’s
predictive mandate would be less troubling. But this is not the case. Instead, the
backward-looking factors are to be used in service of making a prediction about
irreparable corruption.”).
172
173
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prison by examining past behavior. 178 The problem with such an implicit requirement is that it is hardly possible to make it accurately
with adolescent defendants. Given the evolving teen brain and character well into adulthood and the brain’s malleability to environmental stimuli during this time period, predicting future behavior at
this developmental stage would naturally be imprecise. 179
Current scientific research has explored the ability to make these
future determinations and their reliability 180 in light of the fact that
adolescent behavior and decisions are not usually indicative of a
fixed, bad character. 181 Studies have demonstrated that “researchers
struggle to predict which children will persist with criminal behavior
in the future.” 182 The Pittsburgh Youth Study followed a group of
males from childhood to adulthood in an attempt to predict violent
and homicide offending, but “the authors’ model yielded a very high
rate of false positive errors (approximately 87%).” 183 Another study
found a “limited ability to make long-term predictions about individual offending patterns at an early point in the criminal career.” 184
See id. (“The final factor—capacity for change—necessarily requires a forward-looking analysis. By asking a sentencer to determine whether a juvenile is
capable of reform, the logic of the decision necessarily requires some sort of determination about how a juvenile will behave many years in the future.”).
179
See Steinberg & Scott, supra note 155, at 1014 (“Thus, making predictions
about the development of relatively more permanent and enduring traits on the
basis of patterns of risky behavior observed in adolescence is an uncertain business.”).
180
See, e.g., Cauffman et al., supra note 157, at 77.
181
Steinberg & Scott, supra note 155, at 1015.
182
Marshall, supra note 173, at 1658 (citations omitted).
183
Alex R. Piquero, Youth Matters: The Meaning of Miller for Theory, Research, and Policy Regarding Developmental/Life-Course Criminology, 39 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 347, 358 (2013); Piquero et al., supra note
163, at 174 (“[T]he analyses engendered a very high rate of false positive errors
(~87%) . . . , suggesting that the violent offender (if s/he exists), is not easily identifiable.” (citations omitted)).
184
Lila Kazemian et al., Can We Make Accurate Long-term Predictions About
Patterns of De-escalation in Offending Behavior?, 38 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE
384, 395 (2009). This study used data from two longitudinal studies: the Cambridge Study in Delinquent Development and the Montreal Two Samples Longitudinal Study. Id. at 386. In particular, it “assess[ed] the ability to make long-term
predictions (over a 15-year period) about changes in offending behavior based on
various indicators of cognitive predispositions and social bonding.” Id. at 395.
The researchers further noted that “[a]dult experiences may alter offending trajectories, even among the most high-rate offenders . . . .” Id. at 396.
178
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Moreover, a comprehensive examination of the trajectory of criminal activity for serious juvenile offenders confirmed the difficulty to
“predict which high-frequency offenders desist from crime and
which do not . . . .” 185 The limited predictability of future criminality based on unstable teen behavior 186 continues to highlight the
problematic nature of such a requirement embedded in the JLWOP
sentencing scheme.
A final determination of future character is problematic when
applied to individuals whose character is still forming, whether in a
legal or medical context. 187 Yet the Supreme Court delivered an
opinion that expected a judge to engage in such a dangerous sentencing structure. 188 In particular, the last Miller factor, the possibility of rehabilitation, asks sentencers to predict if the juvenile defendant is likely to continue offending or desist from crime. 189 This prediction is highly erroneous 190 and impossible to conduct accurately. 191 Therefore, the predictive aspect of the current discretionary JLWOP system is wholly incompatible with the science and research on developing juveniles. 192

Mulvey et al., supra note 162, at 468, 470 (“This illustrates the difficult
challenge faced by practitioners who must decide which offenders likely represent
an ongoing threat to community safety.”). Finally, although risk factors have been
correlated with future violence, “attempts to correctly predict the violent recidivist
are virtually impossible regardless of the make-up of individual risk and protective factors available to researchers and policy-makers.” Piquero et al., supra note
163, at 177.
186
See, e.g., Mulvey et al., supra note 162, at 468, 470.
187
See, e.g., id.; Cauffman et al., supra note 157, at 77–78, 84–85; Marshall,
supra note 173, at 1659.
188
See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477–78, 480 (2012).
189
See Marshall, supra note 173, at 1647.
190
See, e.g., Piquero, supra note 183, at 358.
191
See, e.g., Piquero et al., supra note 163, at 177.
192
See also Marshall, supra note 173, at 1664 (“Absent the ability to accurately predict a juvenile’s likelihood of rehabilitation, allowing sentencers to make
this prediction poses serious problems for equality and justice in juvenile life
without parole sentencing that require fundamental reform.”).
185
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IV.

THE IMPLICIT CONTRADICTION BEHIND PERMANENT
INCORRIGIBILITY
The path the Supreme Court has taken concerning permanent incorrigibility proves that a determination of permanent incorrigibility
for a juvenile is scientifically and legally contradictory. Roper was
one of the first cases to introduce the principle of crimes reflecting
transient immaturity or permanent incorrigibility, specifically acknowledging that “[i]t is difficult even for expert psychologists to
differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender
whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” 193 Thus, the Court
concluded that laypeople on the jury should not be responsible for
determining whether a juvenile offender deserves the death penalty. 194
Similarly, Graham treated JLWOP as analogous to the death
penalty and reasoned that the nature of juveniles made it questionable for sentencers to make incorrigibility determinations. 195 After
Roper and Graham, it seemed as though the justices were leaning
towards avoiding such permanent incorrigibility determinations in
JLWOP cases. In fact, Graham reiterated the powerful phrase from
a Kentucky court: “‘incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth.’”196
Despite the Court’s reservations in making such judgments about
the future corrigibility of juveniles and the incompatibility of prediction with juvenile reoffending, Miller outright permitted sentencing courts to make the judgment distinguishing between crimes reflecting transient immaturity versus crimes reflecting permanent incorrigibility. 197 The concerns involved in this inconsistent precedent
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 561, 573 (2005) (citing Steinberg & Scott,
supra note 155, at 1014–16). “Irreparable corruption” is often used interchangeably with “permanent incorrigibility.” See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S.
190, 208–09 (2016). Justice Kennedy refers to both terms in the same paragraph
in order to clarify that life without parole must only be imposed to juveniles whose
crimes reflect “permanent incorrigibility” or “irreparable corruption,” as opposed
to “transient immaturity.” Id.
194
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 573.
195
See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 72, 79 (2010).
196
Id. at 73 (quoting Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Ky.
1968)).
197
See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 480 (2012) (“Although we do not
foreclose a sentencer’s ability to make that judgment in homicide cases, we
193
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that tolerates such problematic judgments are explained below to
substantiate the contradictory nature of permanent incorrigibility
findings within JLWOP cases.
Montgomery clarified that Miller did not ban all JLWOP sentences, carving out an exception for “the rarest of juvenile offenders,
those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.” 198 In other
words, a sentencing judge can still impose a discretionary JLWOP
sentence if the juvenile offender is convicted of a homicide 199 and
their crime reflects permanent incorrigibility rather than transient
immaturity. 200 While the first requirement is clear because either the
juvenile committed a homicide or not, the latter is dangerously
vague. Neither Miller nor Montgomery defined what permanent incorrigibility means for sentencing purposes, but the Court offered
the Miller factors to exemplify the types of considerations the sentencer must take into account before imposing JLWOP. 201 In addition, Montgomery articulated that JLWOP is reserved for “children
whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption.” 202 As a result, the
Court “drew a line between children whose crimes reflect transient
immaturity and those rare children whose crimes reflect irreparable
corruption.” 203
Under the current sentencing structure, a sentencer categorizes
the juvenile offender as falling into the transient immaturity pile, not
deserving of a JLWOP sentence, or the permanently incorrigible
side, justifying a JLWOP sentence. 204 In doing so, a sentencing
require it to take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.”).
198
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 209 (2016) (“Before Miller,
every juvenile convicted of a homicide offense could be sentenced to life without
parole. After Miller, it will be the rare juvenile offender who can receive that same
sentence.”).
199
See Graham, 560 U.S. at 82 (“The Constitution prohibits the imposition of
a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.”).
200
Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 209.
201
See Miller, 567 U.S. at 477–78.
202
Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 209.
203
Id.
204
See id. at 210 (“A hearing where ‘youth and its attendant characteristics’
are considered as sentencing factors is necessary to separate those juveniles who
may be sentenced to life without parole from those who may not.” (quoting Miller,
567 U.S. at 465)).

2022]

DISCRETIONARY JLWOP SENTENCING

645

authority indirectly determines the juvenile’s incorrigibility through
the imposition of a discretionary JLWOP sentence. The logic is simple: if a sentencer imposes a life without parole sentence, this implies the juvenile is permanently incorrigible because only the juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility can be
sentenced to life without parole. If a juvenile homicide offender is
not sentenced to life without parole, it implies the individual is not
permanently incorrigible as their crime reflected transient immaturity instead. Consequently, whether or not the Supreme Court in
Jones decided that an explicit finding of permanent incorrigibility is
required, 205 the imposition of a JLWOP sentence alone is already
sufficient to indicate if the juvenile offender was deemed permanently incorrigible.
The paradox lies in decisions imposing discretionary JLWOP
because when a crime reflects permanent incorrigibility, it means
the child is forever incapable of being corrected or reformed 206 and
should be incarcerated without any possibility of release. However,
the science behind the adolescent brain continuously supports the
conclusion that juveniles are not fully mature, leading to impulsive
and risky behaviors, and their character does not form until the midtwenties at the earliest. 207 In addition, research has shown that it is
nearly impossible to reliably predict which juvenile offenders will
turn into adult offenders and continue to commit crimes. 208
Not only has science proved these realities, but the Supreme
Court has adopted them as true in their rulings. 209 Specifically, Justice Kennedy pointed out this logical fallacy: “To justify life without
parole on the assumption that the juvenile offender forever will be a
danger to society requires the sentencer to make a judgment that the
juvenile is incorrigible. The characteristics of juveniles make that
judgment questionable.” 210 Ultimately, these decisions led to Miller,
which established that juveniles cannot be automatically sentenced
to life without parole because of these “distinctive attributes of
youth” that diminish their culpability and reinforce their prospects
205
206
207
208
209
210

See Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021).
See Incorrigible, supra note 15.
See discussion supra Section III.A.
See discussion supra Section III.E.
See discussion supra Section I.A.
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 72–73 (2010).
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of reform. 211 Yet these features seem to lead juveniles to JLWOP
anyway.
Montgomery’s emphasis on a distinction between transient immaturity and permanent incorrigibility in juvenile offenders is where
the contradiction becomes more evident. On the one hand, Miller
recognized a child’s “transient rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability to assess consequences” as a deficiency that will likely be reformed “as the years go by and neurological development occurs.” 212 On the other hand, Montgomery highlighted that Miller still
permitted JLWOP only for the permanently incorrigible juveniles. 213 How can juveniles be found to have temporary characteristics but also be deemed permanently incorrigible? Whether a permanent incorrigibility determination is direct through an explicit finding or indirect through the imposition of a discretionary JLWOP
sentence, a juvenile cannot simultaneously possess transient features
and be forever irreparable. Nonetheless, a JLWOP sentence postMiller embodies this very contradiction because it implicitly views
the juvenile as being eternally corrupt, even though a child’s “distinctive (and transitory) mental traits” and “heightened capacity for
change” 214 are two of the reasons Miller precluded a mandatory
JLWOP in the first place. As Justice Kennedy wrote in Montgomery:
“[T]he penological justifications for life without parole collapse in
light of ‘the distinctive attributes of youth,’” 215 whether mandatory
or discretionary JLWOP is at stake.
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471–72 (2012).
Id. (citations omitted). Miller went so far as to take all the science proving
adolescents’ evolving traits and apply it to any crime, not just the JLWOP context.
Id. at 473 (“But none of what it said about children—about their distinctive (and
transitory) mental traits and environmental vulnerabilities—is crime-specific.
Those features are evident in the same way, and to the same degree, when (as in
both cases here) a botched robbery turns into a killing. So Graham’s reasoning
implicates any life-without-parole sentence imposed on a juvenile, even as its categorical bar relates only to nonhomicide offenses.”).
213
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 208–09 (2016) (“Because Miller
determined that sentencing a child to life without parole is excessive for all but
the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption, it rendered
life without parole an unconstitutional penalty for a class of defendants because
of their status—that is, juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth.” (citations omitted)).
214
Miller, 567 U.S. at 473, 479.
215
Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 208 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 472).
211
212
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A.
The Correct Jones Holding
At this point, the circular question arises: why ban mandatory
JLWOP just to create a discretionary route that still leads juveniles
to a life in prison when they have already been scientifically proven
to be transiently immature and more likely capable of rehabilitation?
The Supreme Court should have taken advantage of the opportunity
in Jones to clarify the requirements of discretionary JLWOP with
respect to the permanent incorrigibility standard. The Court should
have ruled that the Eighth Amendment does not require “the sentencing authority to make a finding that a juvenile is permanently
incorrigible before imposing a sentence of life without parole,”216
but not exactly for the reasons Mississippi argued.
Mississippi presented a persuasive argument when citing that
Montgomery found Miller did not “require trial courts to make a
finding of fact regarding a child’s incorrigibility.” 217 Even if the
Court held that Miller did not explicitly mandate such a formal factfinding requirement, the logical inference drawn from a discretionary JLWOP sentence reveals the implicit determination of permanent incorrigibility anyway. As explained in the preceding section,
sentencers can only impose JLWOP on juveniles whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility, so when sentencers impose JLWOP,
it follows that the juvenile was deemed permanently incorrigible.218
Again, a minor cannot be deemed permanently incorrigible because
such a decision contradicts the Court’s and science’s findings that
juveniles possess transient characteristics. 219
It is illogical to say that juveniles are impulsive, risk-seeking,
and easily influenced by peer pressure, and thus deserve an opportunity to reform themselves as their brain continues to mature, but
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307
(2021) (No. 18-1259); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
217
Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 211 (“That Miller did not impose a formal factfinding requirement does not leave States free to sentence a child whose crime
reflects transient immaturity to life without parole. To the contrary, Miller established that this punishment is disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment.”);
see also Brief for Respondent at 14, Jones, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (No. 18-1259). As
Justice Sotomayor wrote in her Jones dissent, “[t]his statement is the linchpin of
the Court’s opinion.” Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1330 (2021) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
218
See discussion supra Part IV.
219
Id.
216
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then create an exception for those (nonexistent) juveniles who are
permanently incorrigible. 220 Likewise, a juvenile cannot have an enhanced capacity for change but also be found incapable of correction
at any point in their lives; it is either one or the other. 221 In fact, the
former is consistent with brain imaging and research study results,
and the latter lacks scientific support. 222 The former has been repeatedly accepted by the Supreme Court, and the latter has been cautioned against by justices before the creation of the permanent incorrigibility standard. 223
Therefore, any finding of permanent incorrigibility, whether expressly written or inferred from a JLWOP sentence, illogically disregards (1) the scientifically proven enhanced prospect of rehabilitation found in juveniles, 224 (2) the difficulty in accurately predicting permanent incorrigibility,225 and (3) the caselaw adopting these
truths in past opinions.226 Ultimately, the Supreme Court should
have removed the permanent incorrigibility exception allowing for
discretionary JLWOP in Jones to cure this inconsistency.

220

Id.
Id.
222
See discussion supra Part III.
223
See discussion supra Section I.A; see also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48,
74 (2010) (“To justify life without parole on the assumption that the juvenile offender forever will be a danger to society requires the sentencer to make a judgment that the juvenile is incorrigible. The characteristics of juveniles make that
judgment questionable.”); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 561, 573 (2005) (“It is
difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” (citing Steinberg &
Scott, supra note 155, at 1014–16)).
224
See discussion supra Part III; see also Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460,
472 (2012) (reasoning that the “transient rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability
to assess consequences” are likely to reform “as the years go by and neurological
development occurs”); Graham, 560 U.S. at 74 (“The [JLWOP] penalty forswears
altogether the rehabilitative ideal. By denying the defendant the right to reenter
the community, the State makes an irrevocable judgment about that person’s value
and place in society.”).
225
See discussion supra Part III.E.
226
See discussion supra Part I.A.
221
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B.

Potential Criticism to Eliminating Permanent
Incorrigibility
Two criticisms in response to the argument advocating for the
elimination of the permanent incorrigibility standard are rooted in
the inherent limitations of science. 227 First, some may argue that adolescent brain science should not be valued too much in courts due
to the dangers in claiming causality between brain structures and
behaviors: “Just as scientists cannot look at an individual teen’s
brain and conclude that she has a particular level of behavioral maturity, observers cannot look at a teen’s behavior and deduce the
structural or functional maturity of her brain.” 228 However, these
challenges do not negate the meaningful results, even if the strongest
conclusion that can be drawn from these studies is a correlative as
opposed to a causal relationship. Notably, despite the skepticism
about the legal relevance of developmental neuroscience, the Supreme Court justices demonstrated the merited value placed on science when they formally adopted these groundbreaking findings as
elements of their rationale in juvenile sentencing cases. 229
Secondly, critics argue that the inability to draw individualized
conclusions from research studies limits the legal influence of developmental neuroscience. 230 Individual variation is not reflected in
the research because studies paint broad strokes of the adolescent
population as a whole, as opposed to showing that every teenager in
the group, and in the world, reflect the same trend. 231 Individuals
with this perspective contend that some adolescents are more mature

See, e.g., Terry A. Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile Justice, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89, 165 (2009) (“Developmental neuroscience does not shed direct light on the highly individualized determinations that are so commonly at issue in specific criminal cases. Its implications
cannot be fully grasped until its link to behavior is better understood. To tether
law to that science creates dangers—inequality, diminished autonomy, and inaccuracy—with no intrinsic hedge. Therefore, adolescent brain science should not
on its own meaningfully shift doctrine, even if that shift is normatively desirable.
Its inherent limitations do, and should, limit its influence.”).
228
Id. at 148.
229
See discussion supra Section I.A.
230
Maroney, supra note 227, at 146.
231
See id.
227
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than others, 232 and therefore they deserve a harsh punishment like
JLWOP. However, if scientists, whose sole purpose is to study future juvenile reoffending and whose job is to follow these juveniles
into adulthood, are unable to make accurate individualized assessments, then what makes sentencers, who merely meet a juvenile defendant a handful of times, more capable in making reliable individualized predictions about their potential for rehabilitation? Even assuming arguendo that some juveniles are truly incorrigible, it is impossible to accurately predict which fall into this category based on
“snapshots taken when individuals are still teenagers.” 233 It would
seem unwise to make an irrevocable decision about a particular defendant whose brain is still developing. 234 Therefore, it is unjust to
create a sentencing scheme that sentences a youth offender to die in
prison until it is possible to reliably predict which adolescents will
continue to re-offend. 235
Finally, even if critics disagree with the research and the conclusions drawn from these studies, the science has become binding law
in a way. The Court’s acknowledgment of and reliance on research
presenting teenagers’ “transient rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability to assess consequences” adds precedential value behind these
findings. 236 By creating a permanent incorrigibility path to JLWOP,
the Court established a contradictory sentencing scheme for juveniles. 237 This Comment entails a critique of this already established
logical fallacy in the caselaw and a suggested solution to remedy
this injustice. 238

Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Scott, Should Juvenile Offenders Ever Be
Sentenced to Life without the Possibility of Parole?, 53 HUMAN DEV. 53, 54
(2010).
233
Id.
234
See, e.g., id. (“[P]sychologists are notoriously bad at predicting adult functioning from snapshots taken when individuals are still teenagers. We are moderately good at doing so in the aggregate (and even still, we are thrilled when adolescent predictors explain a mere 25% of the variance in adult outcomes), but we
are terrible when it comes to making predictions about individuals.”).
235
See id. at 53.
236
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472 (2012).
237
See discussion supra Part IV.
238
Id.
232
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V.
CONCLUSION
Adolescent brain science has left a mark on the juvenile justice
landscape. Neuroplasticity, coupled with dendric pruning and myelination, rewires and refines the brain at a remarkable rate during
adolescence, resulting in three distinctive qualities of juveniles.239
First, the evolving balance between the cognitive and emotional systems boosts impulsive and risky behaviors that gradually mature
into self-regulatory capabilities as adolescents enter adulthood. 240
Second, research demonstrates a decline in susceptibility to peer
pressure, paralleling brain maturation. 241 Third, the character and
personality of adolescents remain unstable amid all of these neurobiological processes. 242 These findings taken together make it no
surprise that researchers report difficulty in predicting which children will continue to engage in criminal activity in the future. 243 The
courts have implemented this scientific research in their decisions
eliminating the death penalty for juveniles and limiting JLWOP sentences. 244
The two major cases in this line of precedent, Miller and Montgomery, however, expose the contradiction embedded in the requirement that the crime of juvenile homicide offenders must reflect permanent incorrigibility to impose JLWOP. 245 Incorrigibility is inconsistent with the nature of juveniles, given the science and caselaw
establishing the everchanging brain and behavioral patterns of adolescents. 246 Moreover, incorrigibility is most certainly not permanent in light of teenagers’ incomplete maturation of their brains, unfixed character, greater capacity for rehabilitation, as well as the difficulty in predicting future criminality in adolescents. 247 As a result,
a JLWOP sentence premised on the requirement that the juvenile’s
crime reflects permanent incorrigibility is contradictory because a
juvenile cannot possess transient attributes but also be deemed
239
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See discussion supra Section III.A.
See discussion supra Section III.B, C.
See discussion supra Section III.C.
Id.
See discussion supra Section III.E.
See discussion supra Part I.
See discussion supra Part IV.
Id.
See discussion supra Part III.
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permanently incapable of correction. 248 Therefore, the Supreme
Court justices missed a perfect opportunity in Jones to eliminate the
permanent incorrigibility standard from the JLWOP sentencing
scheme and restore some harmony in the JLWOP precedent.
Looking beyond the courtroom, passionate juvenile justice warriors may take legislative action as an avenue for positive change. 249
The new Virginia law enacted in February 2020 is a timely example
of how legislative action can be a successful route for juvenile sentencing reform that reflects developmentally appropriate punishment. 250 Similar advocacy efforts to bar JLWOP continue in other
states in light of the growing awareness of the injustice underlying
equal treatment of adolescents and adults in the application of criminal sentences. 251 Here is to hoping that the rest of the states follow
in Virginia’s footsteps given that the Supreme Court did not take
advantage of their chance to eliminate the contradictory permanent
incorrigibility scheme with their Jones decision.

See discussion supra Part IV.
The Court expressly wrote in their Jones decision that their holding in this
case “does not preclude the States from imposing additional sentencing limits in
cases involving defendants under 18 convicted of murder.” Jones v. Mississippi,
141 S. Ct. 1307, 1323 (2021) (“States may categorically prohibit life without parole for all offenders under 18. Or States may require sentencers to make extra
factual findings before sentencing an offender under 18 to life without parole. Or
States may direct sentencers to formally explain on the record why a life-withoutparole sentence is appropriate notwithstanding the defendant’s youth. States may
also establish rigorous proportionality or other substantive appellate review of
life-without-parole sentences. All of those options, and others, remain available
to the States.”).
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See discussion supra Section I.B.
251
See Heather Renwick, Rejecting Harsh Sentences for Children: 20 Years
of Sentencing Reform, AM. BAR ASS’N (July 9, 2021), https://www.americanbar.
org/groups/litigation/committees/childrens-rights/articles/2018/summer2018-rej
ecting-harsh-sentences-children-20-yrs-sentence-reform/.
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